We represent the functioning of the housing market and the processes that shape residential income segregation by introducing a spatial Agent-Based Model (ABM). Differently from traditional models in urban economics, we explicitly specify the behavior of buyers and sellers and the price formation mechanism. Buyers who differ by income select among heterogeneous neighborhoods using a probabilistic model of residential choice; sellers employ an aspiration level heuristic to set their reservation offer price; prices are determined through a continuous double auction. We first provide an approximate analytical solution of the ABM, shedding light on the structure of the model and on the effect of the parameters. We then simulate the ABM and find that: (i) a more unequal income distribution lowers the prices globally, but implies stronger segregation; (ii) a spike of the demand in one part of the city increases the prices all over the city; (iii) subsidies are more efficient than taxes in fostering social mixing.
Introduction
The allocation of people into the most productive cities is becoming an issue of central importance in a globalized world. Glaeser and Gyourko (2017) argue that while ten years ago policy makers focused on the real-estate implications for financial stability, now their attention has shifted to the lack of affordable housing. Indeed, a growing housing demand into the most productive cities is inducing a soar in the real-estate prices, gradually making it impossible for anyone but the richest individuals to settle and work there. 1 Income segregation between cities is as harmful to the economy as segregation within cities. Indeed, the strengthening of residential income segregation within metropolitan areas (Reardon and Bischoff, 2011) has profound and long-term consequences on educational and labor opportunities (Benabou, 1993) , provision of public goods (Tiebout, 1956 ) and income and wealth inequality (Rognlie, 2016) .
From a theoretical perspective, the spatial income distribution in metropolitan areas has traditionally been studied using spatial equilibrium models (Fujita, 1989; Duranton and Puga, 2015) . These models assume that for each income group there exists a constant utility level across the city, and solve for the equilibrium prices yielding the same utility in each neighborhood. This framework allows for nontrivial insights about the residential choices of fully optimizing agents. However, it does not explicitly represent the behavior of buyers and sellers and does not illustrate the market dynamics that lead some households to segregate in certain areas of the city (or to be segregated out of the city).
In this paper we introduce a baseline Agent-Based Model (ABM) of the housing market, specifically suited to analyze residential income segregation. In our ABM buyers and sellers follow reasonable behavioral rules and heuristics -our model is "behaviorally micro-founded". Prices and segregation patterns are an emergent outcome of the agents' interactions. Because we explicitly represent the functioning of the housing market, we are able to provide more realistic narratives for a variety of phenomena than in traditional models. Moreover, as we need not impose any equilibrium constraint, nor assume that the households strictly maximize their utility, we do not face the technical difficulties that make it hard to include more realistic elements in spatial equilibrium models, 2 and we can easily deal with heterogeneity and dynamics.
Consider for example the mechanism that segregates the poor out of the center, as is common in most European cities. For illustrative purposes here, we define the center as the neighborhood with highest density of amenities. In the spatial equilibrium model of Brueckner et al. (1999) , the key assumption is that the marginal valuation of amenities rises sharply with income, so that high-income households are willing to bid more than low-income households to reside in the center. In our ABM rich and poor households value amenities in the same way, but the bids of high-income households push up the prices in the center until the low-income households can no longer afford buying properties there.
The building blocks of our model are the behavioral rules for the buyers and sellers and the price formation mechanism. The buyers, who differ by income, have to select among heterogeneous neighborhoods where they search for a dwelling.
To make their choice, they consider the value of the housing services they expect to receive in a certain neighborhood -exemplified by an intrinsic attractiveness that subsumes amenities and transportation costs -, their income, and the housing price in that neighborhood. This is just the typical (indirect) utility function in urban economics (Fujita, 1989) . However, instead of maximizing their expected utility, the buyers select a neighborhood with a probability proportional to their utility. This assumption follows the empirically validated literature on discrete choice theory (Anderson et al., 1992) , and introduces some realistic noise in the decision process. 3 The sellers determine their reservation price -the minimum price they are willing to accept -by employing an aspiration level heuristic. This concept was proposed by Simon (1955) , who in fact specifically considered the example of an individual trying to sell a dwelling. The seller would accept any offer above a satisficing threshold, and adjust that threshold downward if the sale was unsuccessful. Search theory has developed this idea by endogenizing the threshold and the waiting time so to follow an optimal stopping rule. A rich literature has applied this idea to model the time on market of real-estate properties.
Most models in search theory assume that the sellers know the distribution of offers by the potential buyers. In real housing markets information is limited and dispersed, and in our model there is an inherent stochasticity due to the noisy decisions of the buyers. Anenberg (2016) introduces a model in which sellers update their reservation price using Bayesian learning on the received offers, so to behave optimally given the available information.
However, in uncertain environments the use of simple heuristics in place of optimization can be optimal. Therefore, following the fast and frugal heuristics paradigm proposed by Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) , we assume that the sellers employ a fixed selling rule, without an explicit attempt to optimize profits. In particular, they try to apply a markup on the market price, and progressively reduce their reservation price as their sale is unsuccessful. Artinger and Gigerenzer (2016) show empirically that most sellers indeed follow this behavioral rule, which yields more profits than equilibrium strategies. 4 Finally, in our ABM buyers and sellers are matched through a continuous double auction taking place in each neighborhood at every time step. Their reservation prices are placed in an order book, and the lowest ask is continuously matched with the highest available bid. Once a match occurs, the price of the transaction is a linear combination of the bid and ask. We use a parameter to tune the bargaining power of the buyers and sellers respectively. The market price in each neighborhood is simply the average of the prices of the transactions that occurred there.
We begin analyzing the model by finding an approximate analytical solution of the ABM. Our strategy is to start from the simplest setting -e.g. all buyers have the same income -and to increase the complexity of the model in a modular way. We do not attempt at finding a general solution, which would be unfeasible, but we provide insights in specific settings that are valid in the most complex settings too. From a methodological point of view, this approach provides two main contributions. First, we show that substantial simplifications can still capture some important aspects of an ABM while allowing for mathematical tractability, as in Gualdi et al. (2015) . Second, the closed-form solutions provide insights that can be used for calibration. For instance, some parameters only occur as a combination (e.g. as a ratio of one parameter to the other), so it is sufficient to analyze the effect of one while holding the other fixed. In applied mathematics and physics, these combinations are known as effective parameters.
We then simulate the ABM and focus on the relation between income distribution of the buyers, residential segregation, prices and policies. First, we find that stronger income inequality leads to stronger residential segregation, in accordance with empirical evidence (Reardon and Bischoff, 2011) . Interestingly, this also leads to lower average prices at the city level, as empirically confirmed too. Määttänen and Terviö (2014) explain this stylized fact by introducing a matching model with an optimal assignment rule between households acting as buyers and households acting as sellers. In our ABM, this finding is simply explained by the price formation mechanism. With extreme income inequality, there are only a few extremely rich households who bid high for a few housing units, while the majority of households bid less. Because the market price at each location is the average of all transaction prices, the global effect is negative.
Second, we find that a spike of the demand in one part of the city increases the prices all over the city. We model the rise of the demand as an additional influx of high-income households in the most attractive locations, mimicking the process of rich "foreigners" trying to purchase properties in the city (Chinco and Mayer, 2015) . The interpretation for this finding is as follows. An increase of the prices in high-income neighborhoods implies that some of the households that would have considered moving there move instead to low-income locations. This is due to a substitution effect with the non-housing consumption good. Therefore, the prices increase at the least attractive locations too. Favilukis and Van Nieuwerburgh (2017) come to the same conclusion within an overlapping generations model, and this finding gets some empirical support from Cvijanovic and Spaenjers (2015) , Sá (2016) and Davids and Georg (2017) .
Third, we implement a system of ad-valorem taxes and subsidies on buyers, and investigate which policy is most effective at fostering social mixing. Low-income households receive subsidies, whereas high-income households have to pay a buyer transaction tax. Effectively, these policies reduce the income spread between the households, but the effect is different if they target the low-end or the high-end of the income distribution. Subsidies directly target the low-income households and make it possible for them to buy properties in previously not affordable neighborhoods. Taxes on the contrary reduce the reservation prices of high-income households, but have no significant effect on transaction prices because these are still below the reservation prices of the rich. Note that in our model the only transmission channel for taxes is through reducing the reservation prices. As we assume inelastic global demand, taxes do not crowd out high-income households (Dachis et al., 2011) . 5 We conclude this introduction comparing our paper with existing ABMs of the housing market. Feitosa et al. (2008) propose an ABM which shows how segregation can emerge even if one considers the simplest setting with the minimal number of parameters. The opposite end of the complexity spectrum is taken by Gilbert et al. (2009) : They build an ABM where some houses can be constructed, others are demolished, some agents may put their apartment on sale because they lost their job, etc. Filatova et al. (2009) introduce an ABM which is pretty much in the spirit of the present paper, but they assume that the reservation offer price is just 25% more of the so-called agricultural rent (Fujita, 1989) . Our aim here is to represent the supply side in a more detailed way, using an aspiration level heuristic to determine the offer price. We build on Gauvin et al. (2013) , by which our model shares many assumptions but differs substantially on the behavioral rules and the market mechanism. Erlingsson et al. (2014) and Baptista et al. (2016) are nonspatial ABMs of the housing market which focus on its implications for financial stability. Nevertheless, they share some assumptions with our ABM.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model; we then give an approximate mathematical description of it in Section 3, and provide results from the numerical simulations in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Model
A schematic representation of the model is provided in Figure 1 . The city is mathematically defined as a grid in the Cartesian plane. A specific point of the grid is a location. Space is characterized by different levels of attractiveness, a variable subsuming amenities, job opportunities and convenience in transportation. Time is discrete. At each time step:
1. Some households -the buyers -come to the city from the outside and try to purchase a dwelling in the metropolitan housing market. They select a location with a probability proportional to the expected utility in that location.
2. Households already living in the city decide to put their dwelling on sale with a certain probability. We refer to the households with a dwelling on the market as "the sellers".
3. The buyers have heterogeneous incomes and bid a certain amount in order to secure a property. The bids are proportional to their income.
4. The sellers determine the price they ask by employing an aspiration level heuristic.
5. At each location, buyers and sellers are matched through a continuous double auction. The transaction price is a weighted average of the bid and ask prices. The weight depends on the bargaining power.
6. Successful buyers take residence in the location where they searched and successful sellers leave the city. The market price is computed at each location as the average price of the transactions that occurred there.
The goal of this paper is to introduce a baseline ABM of the housing market, in which realistic behavioral rules give rise to a variety of phenomena, therefore we simplify many aspects of the model. This choice is also necessary to keep the ABM analytically tractable. While describing the model, we highlight a number of possible modifications that would improve the realism of the ABM. Most importantly, in this paper we only focus on steady states -our model describes what At each location there are N identical housing units, and space is characterized by different levels of attractiveness. At every time step, Γ buyers come to the city from the outside and current inhabitants put on sale their dwelling with probability α. At each location and every time step, buyers and sellers are matched through a continuous double auction, here visually depicted with discrete demand and supply curves constructed from the reservation prices of the agents.
would happen to the spatial price distribution and income segregation patterns in the long run, if the current state of the city was to persist.
Space and time
The city is defined as a two-dimensional square grid Ω of locations X ∈ Z 2 , with linear size L. The origin O is taken as the geographical center of the city, and two neighboring locations are separated by a distance a. All locations are characterized by an intrinsic attractiveness A(X). The attractiveness quantifies the presence of natural amenities, historic buildings, social opportunities, the closeness to employment centers and the convenience of the transportation system at that location. 6 Two remarks are important here. First, A(X) is exogenous and constant over time. There is a substantial literature on the endogenization of the attractiveness, mostly in terms of agglomeration economies (Duranton and Puga, 2004; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Ahlfeldt et al., 2015) . Because we do not consider a production sector, we neglect these effects and focus on the implications of a given A(X) on the housing market.
Second, in this paper we only consider a monocentric city where the attractiveness decreases with the distance from the center (differently from Figure 1 ). This captures the idea of a city where most amenities and job opportunities are concentrated in the center (Brueckner et al., 1999) . By tuning A(X), our ABM trivially generalizes to cities with arbitrarily distributed attractiveness -as in Figure 1 -, including polycentric cities (Fujita and Ogawa, 1982; Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002) , or cities where the rich choose to live in the peripheries (Alonso, 1964) .
The same number N of identical dwellings 7 are available at each location X ∈ Ω. Time is discrete and indexed by t. The time horizon is infinite.
Agents
The agents are households. At each time step t a constant number Γ of households arrive on the market from outside the city and try to purchase one property. We refer to these agents as "the buyers". These households are only characterized by their monthly income Y . For simplicity, we consider a finite number K of income levels. Agents with the same income are denoted by k-agents, k ∈ {1, ..., K}, and have income Y k . These incomes are ordered by increasing values, Y 1 < Y 2 < ... < Y K , and are separated by a constant ∆. We denote the number of incoming agents in each income category by Γ k , s.t.
k Γ k = Γ. At the end of each time step, some of the buyers secure a property and take residence in the city -we refer to these agents as "housed". We assume that the unsuccessful buyers leave the city and may come back with a subsequent cohort. Indeed, it is not useful to keep track of the identities of the buyers, as these agents are only characterized by their income.
At the beginning of each time step, households already living in the city may put their dwelling on sale with a constant and homogeneous probability α. Housed agents whose dwelling is on the market are denoted as "sellers". The sum of buyers, sellers and housed agents is constant and equal to Γ + N L 2 . At t = 0, all agents in the city are housed. When t > 0, the relative proportion of housed and sellers depends on the number of buyers Γ, on the sale probability α and on the market outcomes.
In this model Γ and α are fixed, but it could be useful to make them depend on the level of the prices in the city and on the timing with respect to the house price cycle. For instance, α could be larger if the prices are rising and smaller if the prices are falling. However, being primarily concerned with income segregation, we are mostly interested in the long-term trends and the relative prices between several areas of the city, which are influenced more strongly by the attractiveness than by the global demand or leave rate.
Demand
At each time step t, demand at each location X is determined by the individual decisions of the buyers. The k-buyers have utility function
where z k (t) represents the monthly non-housing consumption (this is a common modeling choice in urban economics, see Fujita 1989) of k-agents at time t. The parameter β ∈ [0, 1] is the weight given to the attractiveness, which exemplifies housing consumption. The budget constraint is
where P (X, t) is the expected monthly mortgage repayment after purchasing a property at location X and time t (the determination of P (X, t) will be explained at the end of Section 2). We have also assumed unit cost for the non-housing consumption good, which is the numéraire of the economy. (This is also a standard modeling choice in urban economics.) The above equation does not assume savings.
If we wanted to include savings, we could just consider that the buyers spend a fraction s of their income Y k , and redefine the incomes in the model as the part that is not saved. Replacing the budget constraint in the utility function, we get the indirect utility
In case Y k ≤ P (X, t) the k-agents cannot afford to purchase a property at location X and time t, and so their utility would be 0.
We consider a probabilistic model for the choice of residential location by the buyers. The k-buyers choose location X at time t with probability π k (X, t), proportional to the utility they expect to find at that location:
This behavioral rule follows the literature on discrete choice theory (Anderson et al., 1992) , and captures the idea that the decisions of the buyers are noisy, although not irrational. 8 To sum up, the demand side of the market at location X and time t is characterized by the number of k-buyers N k b (X, t), ∀k -determined stochastically from Eq. (3) -and by their reservation demand price, which we simply assume to be a multiple of their monthly income:
The reservation demand price is the maximum amount the buyers are willing to bid. So they may potentially borrow an amount ζY k from a bank, and repay it monthly in ζ installments. For clarity of exposition, we will consider ζ = 1, but this is equivalent to normalizing all prices to their monthly equivalent.
Supply
The dwellings available for sale at location X and time t are those that are put on the market by the agents housed in X in the same time step plus, if any, those that
have not yet been sold on previous time steps. We denote the number of sellers as N s (X, t).
The reservation offer price is the minimum amount a seller is willing to accept to sell his property. Following Simon (1955) and Artinger and Gigerenzer (2016) we postulate that the sellers use an aspiration level heuristic to decide their reservation price. They first attempt to sell at a higher price than the market price, trying to apply a markup µ on the current market price. If the sellers are unsuccessful in selling after τ time steps, they adjust their reservation price downward by a factor λ. Here λ captures the "downward stickiness" typical of housing market: when demand increases, prices rise quickly, but in situations of excess supply prices decrease slowly. In formula, the reservation offer price P s i (X, t) for household i at location X at time t is
where t i is the time step in which household i put their apartment on sale, and t − t i is the time on market. The reservation price is decreased by a factor λ every multiple m of τ . Note that -differently from the case of the buyers -here we need to keep track of the identities of all sellers i, as all reservation offer prices can potentially be heterogeneous.
Matching
Matching between buyers and sellers occurs at each location and each time step through a continuous double auction. The reservation offer (demand) prices enter in a random sequence as asks (bids) in a limit order book. Every time a bid price exceeds an ask price, a transaction takes place and the two prices are removed from the order book. This process continues until all agents have placed their orders. The price of the transaction depends on bargaining, which we model in a stylized fashion. In particular, we assume that the price of a transaction between a k-buyer and seller i is a linear combination of the reservation prices, P ki = νP d k + (1 − ν)P s i . Here ν quantifies the bargaining power of the seller. If ν = 0, the transaction price is simply the reservation price of the seller -this parameterization would model a situation in which the seller needs to post his reservation price -while if ν > 0 the seller would post a higher price.
Finally, the market price P (X, t) is the average of all transaction prices that were recorded at location X and time t.
Mathematical analysis
The goal of this section is to show that, in spite of the complexity of the ABM, some of its features can be understood analytically without the need to resort to numerical simulations. Our analytical solution gives insights on the causal mechanisms of the ABM and allows to understand the effect of the parameters. We follow a modular strategy, in the sense that we progressively focus on specific aspects of the ABM while neglecting other features in order to maintain tractability.
In particular, in Section 3.2 we assume that the agents only value the attractiveness in their utility function (i.e. β = 1 in Eq. 2) and we consider only one income category (i.e. K = 1). In Section 3.3 we relax the assumption that β = 1, and focus on the tradeoff between non-housing consumption and attractiveness. In Section 3.4 we consider two income categories (i.e. K = 2) and study the conditions that imply income segregation.
Preliminary steps
The following simplifying assumptions are made for analytical tractability. These simplifications are then relaxed in the numerical simulations.
First, we average out stochastic effects by taking expected values. For example, although the number of buyers coming to each location X is given by a multinomial stochastic process with probabilities defined in Eq. (3), we assume that the number of buyers at X is the expected value of the process.
Second, we assume continuous space by considering a vanishing distance between locations, a → 0. This step requires an important technical attention. So far all quantities were defined for each location X -e.g. the number of k-buyers at X was N k b (X, t). In order to take the continuum limit we cannot keep using this definition. Indeed, when a → 0 and L is fixed the number of locations (L/a) grows large, so for example the number of k-buyers in any specific X would become vanishingly small (for fixed total number of buyers Γ).
We solve this technical issue by dividing all quantities that are defined at the location level by the local area a 2 . These quantities are now mathematically defined as densities, and we denote them by a lower-case letter. For example the density of k-buyers at X and t is n k
, and so the density is well defined in the limit. The other variables we have to transform are N s (X, t) → n s (X, t) = N s (X, t)/a 2 and N → n = N/a 2 , where n = n(X) is uniform for all X.
Third, we assume circular symmetry and that the attractiveness decreases with the distance r from the center O (monocentric city). Therefore, we can write the attractiveness as A(r), with A (r) < 0. A possible specification of A(r) is
where R is a steepness parameter that quantifies how much the attractiveness is concentrated in the center. 9 If R is very small, only the center is very attractive and the peripheries are not attractive; if R is large, the attractiveness is spread evenly across the city. R max represents the border of the city, and is chosen so that the areas of the discrete-space square lattice Ω and its continuous-space circular approximation considered in Eq. (5) are the same, that is πR 2 max = L 2 . In order to emphasize that the results that follow do not depend on the specific form of the attractiveness in Eq. (5), we write in general A(r), except when performing specific calculations.
Finally, we focus on the steady state of the model. As already mentioned, our ABM determines the economic outcomes in the long run, if the current state of the city was to persist.
Baseline case
Here we only consider one income category. We also assume that the buyers only value the attractiveness in their utility function (and so do not value the nonhousing consumption). We proceed in three steps. First, we calculate the densities of buyers and sellers at any distance r, in the steady state. Second, we compute the average reservation demand and offer prices. Third, we obtain the market price.
We start calculating the expected steady state densities of buyers and sellers at distance r. We denote them by n b (r) and n s (r) respectively. The density of buyers is obtained multiplying the number of buyers Γ by the probability density to choose a location at r (Eq. 3), given by the attractiveness A(r) and by a normalization factor Z:
The density of sellers n s (r, t) can be computed by summing the density of apartments already on sale, denoted byn s (r, t), and the expected fraction of apartments newly put on sale: n s (r, t) =n s (r, t)+α (n −n s (r, t)). By definition the apartments already on sale at time t are those that were not sold at time t − 1. In order to calculaten s (r, t) we make the crucial assumption in this mathematical derivation, namely that all buyers at location r and time t − 1 succeed in securing an apartment. This assumption is correct only if two conditions are met. First, the number of buyers must be smaller or equal than the number of sellers. Second, all buyers must afford the dwellings, that is the reservation demand price of all buyers must be larger than the reservation offer price of all sellers. We will check ex-post the validity of this assumption for each location r.
In any case, if all buyers secure an apartment, we haven s (r, t) = n s (r, t − 1) − n b (r, t − 1). In steady state,
We now calculate the expected reservation prices. Since there is only one income category, the reservation demand prices are all identical, and correspond to Y = Y 1 . On the contrary, the reservation offer prices are heterogeneous, because they depend on the time on market (Eq. 4). Here we make a slightly simplifying assumption, namely that the sale probability is the same for all dwellings on the market at location r, and therefore corresponds to the market tightness q = n b /n s . In fact, cheaper dwellings are more likely to sell in the order book, but we will show that this is a second-order effect. Using Eq. (4), the expected steady state reservation offer price at a location at distance r is E{P s, }(r) = (1 + µ)P (r)E{λ
In the steady state, at each time step a dwelling on the market is sold with probability q , and not sold with probability 1 − q . We can calculate the expected discount E{λ k/τ }, with k = t − t i , by using the geometric distribution: 10
We can finally write the market price at distance r from the center, in steady state. We use Eqs. (8) and (9) and the definition of market price, that is a weighted average of the expected reservation and offer prices, with weight ν ∈ [0, 1]:
Solving for P (r) yields
As mentioned above, this expression is correct provided that 0 < q < 1 and P (r) < Y.
We now look at at three limiting cases in which the conditions (12) may not be satisfied. This also gives insights on the causal mechanisms of the model. Attractiveness. We consider the least attractive locations, in which almost no buyers purchase any property. From Eq. (11), lim A(r)/Z→0 P (r) = νY . The reservation prices of the sellers drop to zero because the time on market grows large, so the market price is simply determined by the bargaining parameter ν and by the reservation price of the buyers Y . The conditions (12) are satisfied.
Tightness. We consider some attractive location in which the number of buyers equals the number of sellers -in other words the tightness is q = 1. We have lim q →1 P (r) = νY / (1 − (1 + µ)(1 − ν)). The expression for the market price simplifies considerably. However, it is possible to check that P (r) ≥ Y , which is inconsistent with the assumptions of the model (sellers cannot bid more than their income Y ). This is easily explained in dynamical terms. Suppose that at time t the price is P < Y . The buyers bid Y , while the sellers ask (1 + µ)P . So the price at time t + 1 is P = νY + (1 − ν)(1 + µ)P > P . As the sellers immediately sell their property, their reservation offer price has no time to decrease, so a steady state cannot be reached.
Stickiness. We now assume that the prices are extremely sticky, in the sense that the discount factor of the sellers λ 1/τ is close to unity. In the limit, lim λ 1/τ →1 P (r) = νY / (1 − (1 + µ)(1 − ν)). The outcome is the same as for q → 1. Indeed, the dynamics are similar. Assume that the agents put their dwelling on sale at t, when the price is P . At t t they still ask (1 + µ)P , and so the price cannot reach a steady state. Note that in Eq. (11), λ and τ occur as a combination of parameters, λ 1/τ . They are effectively only one parameter, as it is enough to vary one while holding the other fixed.
Given the above analysis, we impose the constraint that if P (r) > Y , we set P (r) = Y . This constraint simply formalizes the idea that the buyers cannot bid more than Y , and so the market price cannot be higher.
As can be seen in Fig. 2a , the mathematical results are in line with the numerical simulations of the discrete-space and fully heterogeneous dynamics. The prices are slightly overestimated by the mathematical analysis. This is because of the order book dynamics. Sellers with a lower reservation price have higher chance of selling, but this effect is not captured in Eq. (10), which we have derived assuming that all dwellings on the market at r are sold with the same probability. 
General utility
In general, the utility function for k-buyers for choosing a location at distance r from the center at time t is
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Since just the utility function is different from the previous section, the analysis is similar. In particular, the fixed point P (r) has the same functional form as in Eq. (11), except that the ratio A(r)/Z is replaced by U (r)/Z , where
The problem is that we cannot explicitly solve for P (r) anymore, so we must use an iterative method. For each value of β, we start from the value of Z that we observe in the simulations, and solve Eq. (11) (up to the transformation A(r)/Z → U (r)/Z ) numerically for 10000 values of r, 0 < r < R max . We then numerically compute Z from Eq. (15) with the trapezoidal method, and iterate this procedure until convergence for Z is reached. As it can be seen in Fig. 2b , for small values of β the prices are almost uniform across the city, due to the substitution effect between housing and non-housing consumption, whereas larger values of β increase the slope of the price gradient.
Two categories
Now we keep β = 1 and consider two income categories, K = 2. The income levels of the agents are Y 1 and Y 2 , with Y 2 = Y 1 + ∆. We denote the households respectively as 1-agents and 2-agents -the poor and the rich respectively. We study under which conditions the market mechanism implies income segregation. Under the assumptions made in this section, the best way to determine this is to check if there exists a completely segregated circle with center O and radius r s ∈ [0, R max ], which is only inhabited by 2-agents. In this circle the steady state value for the market price must be higher than the income level of the 1-agents, formally P (r) > Y 1 , ∀r < r s . Since the circle is inhabited only by 2-agents, we can use the one category result in Eq. (11) with Y = Y 2 and Γ = Γ 2 . Rearranging the boundary condition P (r s ) = Y 1 , and considering the specific form of the attractiveness as in Eq. (5), we can compute r s , the radius of the segregated region:
(16) We study the effect of the parameters on r s . It increases with the number of incoming high-income households Γ 2 , and with the markup µ that the sellers try to apply. Indeed, Γ 2 is only in the numerator and multiplies the squared brackets, and µ is only in the numerator and provides a non-negative contribution. On the contrary, the radius r s decreases with the number of available apartments n -which is only in the denominator -, supporting the policy that less regulatory constraints on constructions may alleviate income segregation. The role of the other parameters cannot be immediately seen from Eq. (16), so in Fig. 3 we plot the radius of the segregated region as a function of a few interesting parameters. In Fig. 3a we consider R, the scale factor of the exponential in Eq. (5) that quantifies how evenly spread is the attractiveness. Interestingly, as R increases there is a non-monotonic effect. When R is small (up to R = 3 in Fig. 3a) , all 2-buyers want to reside in the center and this keeps the prices above the income level Y 1 of the 1-agents. The radius r s grows with R, because the 2-buyers spread in a larger region. But after a turning point, r s starts decreasing, because the 2-buyers spread more and more evenly and are not numerous enough at any specific location to keep the prices above Y 1 . This result is in line with Gaigné et al. (2017) , who find that a multimodal distribution of amenities may foster social mixing.
In Fig. 3b we look at ∆/Y 1 , that quantifies the relative spread of income levels. These parameters always occur as a ratio of one another, suggesting that they can be treated as a unique parameter. A larger ∆/Y 1 slightly increases segregation, almost in a linear fashion. Finally, in Fig. 3c we show that more stickiness leads to more segregation. There is an asymptote at λ 1/τ → 1, in which the reservation offer prices never decrease, as discussed in Section 3.2.
Numerical simulations
In this section we perform some numerical simulations of the fully-fledged ABM to analyze the effect of the income distribution and of subsidies and taxes on the prices and segregation patterns. We consider ten income categories, K = 10, and we assume that the agents face a tradeoff between housing and non-housing consumption (β = 0.5). The other values for the baseline parameters are discussed in the Appendix. We set some parameters following guidance from the mathematical analysis, and set other parameters to empirically reasonable values.
The cost of considering a more realistic setting is that no analytical solution is possible. To ensure full replicability, the code used for the simulations is available upon request to the corresponding author.
Effect of the income distribution
We study the effect of the income distribution of the buyers on the prices and segregation patterns. We consider twelve income distributions, with increasing levels of inequality. We keep the shares of k-buyers Γ k /Γ fixed, and vary instead the minimum income Y 1 and the total income spread ∆. Indeed, buyers categories are arbitrarily defined, and it is the relative income spread ∆/Y 1 that determines the level of inequality (see below). The important constraint is that the total income of the buyers must be the same across income distributions to allow for a meaningful comparison.
The total income of the buyers is
In order to quantify the income inequality, we take one of the possible definitions of the Gini index, namely half the relative absolute mean difference of incomes (Cowell, 2000) . With the discrete distribution we consider, the Gini index reads In Figure 4a we show the shares of k-agents as a function of the distance from the center in the case of the most equal income distribution. This figure shows that the categories with lowest income (k = 1-3) are segregated out of the center, while agents from the other categories are mostly located up to distance r = 4. However, the shares of k-buyers (k > 3) at locations r < 4 are not proportional to the population shares. For example, at r = 0 the share of 10-agents is roughly 1/3 than the share of 4-agents, but in the population Γ 10 /Γ 4 = 1/5, so 10-agents are over-represented in the center. This is caused by the substitution effect and by the continuous double auction: although the market price is below the reservation price of 4-buyers, 11 10-buyers bid higher and are matched first. Because in the very center demand largely exceeds supply, 10-agents are more likely to secure an apartment.
It is not meaningful to compare different income distributions by considering the spatial distribution of the shares of k-agents (as in Figure 4a ). Indeed, these categories are arbitrarily defined and we need to measure segregation in a way that is independent of the level of inequality. Therefore we resort to a rank-order information theory index (Reardon and Bischoff, 2011) which only uses information about the rank ordering of incomes, and is thus independent of the income distribution. We denote income percentile ranks by p ∈ [0, 1]. For any given value of p, we calculate the segregation over the city between households with income ranks less than p and households with income ranks greater or equal to p. We then average over all values of p. More specifically, denote by
the information entropy of the population when divided into these two groups, and by
the Theil index of segregation in the population divided between these two groups, where E X (p) is the information entropy calculated at location X. The rank-order information theory index H R is then
This quantity varies between a minimum of zero, which corresponds to complete lack of segregation (the income distribution in each location X mirrors the global income distribution, so that E X (p) = E(p), ∀X ∈ Ω), and a maximum of one with complete income segregation (in every location all households have the same income). In Figure 4b we show how the segregation index H R varies with the level of inequality, as measured by the Gini index. We see that segregation increases with inequality, most strongly for G < 0.38. There is little empirical evidence on the effect of income inequality on income segregation, because spatial income data are rarely available. Most studies (Wheeler and La Jeunesse, 2008; Watson, 2009; Reardon and Bischoff, 2011 ) rely on U.S. census data, because binned income distributions (with 15-25 bins) are available for each census tract. These studies find that income inequality increases income segregation, in accordance with our model. Reardon and Bischoff (2011) attribute this result to income-correlated social preferences, 12 or to higher provision of local public goods in neighborhoods where the rich live (Tiebout, 1956 ). Here we show that the heterogeneity of the buyers and the market mechanism itself can explain this result.
We look at the spatial distribution of prices in Figure 5 . Comparing the most unequal and the most equal income distributions, in the unequal case the prices are higher in center and lower in the peripheries. Indeed, in the outskirts the share of lowest-income households -recall that their income is Y 1 = 5 in the unequal case, and Y 1 = 30 for the most equal distribution -is larger, reducing the prices. Because most agents reside in the locations where the prices go down, the global effect on prices is negative (-5%). This result is in line with Määttänen and Terviö (2014) , who come to the same conclusion using an assignment model that determines an equilibrium price gradient. The authors also show that this finding is supported empirically in a number of U.S. cities. Using their model, they perform a counterfactual exercise and calculate what the prices would be if the level of inequality had not increased. They find values between 0 and 10% higher according to the specific metropolitan area, in quantitative accordance with our model.
We also experiment with an additional influx of rich agents in the center. We mimic the process by which rich households coming from outside -the "foreigners" -purchase real-estate properties in a city, either as an investment good or as a secondary residence. These buyers usually choose the most attractive locations, and distort the local housing market because of their disproportionally high reservation prices (Chinco and Mayer, 2015) . We test whether the prices grow all over the city, or whether the prices just raise in the center.
We assume that Γ/10 "foreigners" try to purchase a property at any time step t with uniform probability in all locations within a radius r = 3 from the origin O, i.e. ∀X = (x, y) ∈ Z 2 s.t. x 2 + y 2 ≤ 9. The income of the foreigners is Y K + ∆, that is larger by a factor of ∆ than the income of the K-agents. We consider the equal income distribution as a benchmark (but the results are robust to the choice of the distribution). Figure 5 reports that the prices increase substantially in the area where the foreigners search, but also all over the city, especially in the peripheries.
The arrival of foreigners in the center leads to price growth in the most attractive locations, which makes them less appealing to high-income households. Indeed, recall from Section 2.3 that households also value non-housing consumption, and so are willing to substitute the intrinsic attractiveness for cheaper locations where they can afford a higher consumption level. As the high-income households move to less attractive locations, their bids push up the prices there as well. So middleincome households may decide to search in the least attractive locations, and the process cascades all over the city in the steady state.
We could not find any direct empirical evidence on these conclusions. However, Cvijanovic and Spaenjers (2015) analyze the purchases of foreigners in the Paris housing market and show that foreigners crowd out residents, overpay and cause prices to increase in the most attractive locations. Sá (2016) finds that foreign investment in England and Wales has a positive causal effect on house price growth at different percentiles of the distribution, but she does not consider the spatial aspect. Finally, Davids and Georg (2017) analyze foreign property investment in Cape Town, and find some evidence that prices also increase in the suburbs where the foreigners do not buy. From a theoretical point of view, Favilukis and Van Nieuwerburgh (2017) come to our same conclusions. They use an overlapping generations model in which heterogeneous households decide consumption, savings, labor supply, tenure status, and location. In equilibrium, the households anticipate the arrival of the foreigners (out-of-town home buyers), and adjust their decisions accordingly.
Effect of subsidies and taxes
We investigate which policy is most effective at reducing income segregation. Housing market policies have been traditionally divided in two strands.
First, subsidized housing aims to improve the accessibility of low-income households to the housing market. There are two types of subsidized housing -projectbased and tenant or buyer-based (Sinai and Waldfogel, 2005) . The former include public housing and subsidies to the construction sector, which is incentivized to construct new affordable houses. The latter include buyer-based vouchers, certificates, rent supplements etc. There is a strong consensus in the literature for buyer-based Figure 4 , and with an additional influx of rich buyers who search for an apartment only in the center. In the latter case, the prices increase all over the city. Globally, the prices are lower if the income distribution is unequal.
subsidies (Olsen, 2003) , and so we focus on this policy (also, we do not consider constructions in our model).
Second, transaction taxes increase the cost of transacting a dwelling. To avoid paying the tax, many households may postpone buying or selling a dwelling (Dachis et al., 2011) , or adjust the transaction price to exploit discontinuities in tax liability (Best and Kleven, 2017) . For our purposes, transaction taxes are also aimed at "cooling" the housing market and therefore improve affordability for low-income households, as confirmed by the recent 15% transaction tax on foreign purchases in Vancouver. 13 Transaction taxes can be on buyers (in the form of stamp duty taxes) or on sellers (capital gains tax). We focus here on transaction taxes on buyers, which are widespread in OECD countries (Van Ommeren and Van Leuvensteijn, 2005) .
We implement a system of ad-valorem taxes and subsidies on buyers in a stylized fashion. We denote by ξ k the tax or subsidy for k-agents, where ξ k > 0 indicates a tax, and ξ k < 0 denotes a subsidy. For example, a 10% subsidy corresponds to ξ k = −0.1, and a 10% tax to ξ k = 0.1. The budget constraint of the buyers becomes z k (t)+(1+ξ k )P (X, t) = Y k . Replacing the budget constraint in the utility function, we get
The reservation demand prices are also affected by the tax or subsidy, with
For instance, with a 10% subsidy, the purchasing power of agents with income Y = 15 rises to Y /0.9 = 16.7. On the contrary, with a 10% tax, the purchasing power of agents with the same income reduces to Y 1 /1.1 = 13.6.
We analyze the effect of three policies on the prices and segregation patterns, and compare with the no policy benchmark. The magnitude of subsidies and taxes should not be taken literally, as we are interested in qualitative differences and are not calibrating the model against real data. The policies are:
• Subsidies only: ξ S = (−0.20, −0.15, −0.10, −0.05, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00). 1-agents receive a 20% subsidy, 2-agents receive a 15% subsidy, etc.
• Taxes only: ξ T = (0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20). We implement an income-dependent transaction tax, with 10-agents paying 20% of the transaction price, 9-agents paying 15%, etc.
• Subsidies and taxes: ξ ST = (−0.20, −0.15, −0.10, −0.05, 0.00, 0.00, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20). We combine the systems of taxes and subsidies. With this policy subsidies are funded through transaction taxes. Figure 6 illustrates the results of our policy exercise. In Figure 6a we see that taxes have a very small effect in mitigating income segregation, whereas subsidies are more effective (and if used in combination with taxes yield the lowest segregation). The effect of policies is more pronounced if the level of income inequality is not too high. Figure 6b shows the average market price for the various policies. In this model, taxes are not successful at decreasing the prices. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the reservation prices of the richest buyers -who are the ones mostly affected by the taxes -are still above the market price at any location, so the richest buyers do not pay a fundamentally different price. Second, because the global demand Γ is assumed inelastic, taxes cannot crowd out rich buyers. Figure 6b also shows that subsidies increase the market price. However, the rise is included between 4 and 6 price units, whereas the growth in purchasing power that the subsidies entail for the lowest-income households is 7.5 price units (Y 1 /ξ 1 = 30/0.8 = 37.5).
Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a baseline Agent-Based Model (ABM) of the housing market. Our goal was to show that it is possible to obtain realistic narratives for a variety of phenomena -mainly related to residential income segregation -by explicitly representing the behavior of buyers and sellers and the market dynamics. In our model, the behavioral rules rely on discrete choice theory and on the fast and frugal heuristics paradigm, and the market mechanism is depicted using a continuous double auction. We need not impose any mutual consistency requirement (such as finding the conditions for which all agents have the same utility) because this is not necessary in the ABM methodology.
We have found an approximate analytical solution of the ABM. From a methodological point of view, this shows that ABMs are not incompatible with mathematical analyses, and that equilibrium and rationality are not simplifying assumptions necessary for mathematical tractability. Our analytical solution makes it possible to analyze the structure of the model and the effect of the parameters. For instance, a closed-form solution shows that a flat distribution of intrinsic attractiveness (exemplifying amenities and transportation facilities) reduces income segregation.
We have simulated the model to study the interplay between the income distribution of the buyers and the spatial price distribution, with a focus on the segregation patterns. We have then analyzed the global effect of a demand spike localized in the center, and we have compared a number of policies whose goal is to foster social mixing. Our results are in line with other findings in the literature, but our modeling methodology allows for a simpler narrative that directly matches the housing market dynamics.
Our model can be extended in several ways, depending on the research question. Because of the enhanced flexibility implied by the lack of equilibrium and optimization, it is extremely easy to add more realistic features (at least in the numerical simulations). We may endogenize the global demand and the leaving rate. Coupled with a role for expectations, this is likely to generate price cycles in the city. We can endogenize the attractiveness, either with a social component that depends on the income distribution of the neighborhood, or allowing for changes in the attractiveness over time. These extensions would make it possible to study gentrification phenomena. We can finally model a productive sector, so to consider the interplay between agglomeration economies and income segregation, or mortgages and a financial sector, so to look at the implications of the model on macroprudential regulation.
More importantly, this paper has served as a qualitative demonstration that a more realistic representation of the housing market can account for a wide range of both well-known and less obvious phenomena. It would be interesting to show that housing market ABMs, because they are a closer match to reality, outperform spatial equilibrium or assignment models quantitatively, i.e. to fit and predict real housing market data.
A Parameter values
The baseline parameter values are reported in Table 1 .
We discuss the calibration choices below:
• λ = 0.95. Merlo and Ortalo-Magne (2004) analyze one of the most detailed datasets on listing price changes and offers made between initial listing and sale agreement. They find that, on average, the first price reduction is 5.3% and the second reduction is 4.4%. Baptista et al. (2016) obtained from Zoopla data (Zoopla is a popular online portal for real-estate services in England).
• Γ = 1000, N = 100, α = 0.1. As shown in Eq. (11), the price is determined (among other things) by the relative magnitude of these parameters. We chose these specific values to have a reasonable level of noise. Indeed, with too few agents (e.g. Γ = 100, N = 10) the random arrival of buyers would generate wild price fluctuations, and with too many agents (e.g. Γ = 10000, N = 1000) the price dynamics would almost be deterministic.
• β = 0.5. The households value housing and non-housing consumption equally.
• L = 11, R max = 6.21, R = 3, a = 1. The attractiveness decreases at R to approximately 1/3 of its value in the center. With this choice, R is close to half the radius of the city. Therefore, we have an attractive center and a nonattractive periphery, which is a necessary condition for price differentiation. L (or equivalently R max ) and a just determine the size of the city.
• µ = 0.1, ν = 0.1. This parametrization captures the idea that the sellers have to post a price, which cannot be much higher than the market price. Therefore, most bargaining power is on the buyers' side.
• Y 1 = 15, ∆ = 5 and K = 10. These parameters are chosen together to model a specific income distribution. The absolute magnitudes of Y 1 and ∆ do not matter, only their ratio ∆/Y 1 determines the inequality in the income distribution. While these values for Y 1 and ∆ have been used to produce Figure 3 , in Table 2 we list all the values that correspond to the twelve income distributions used in Section 4. 
